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Introduction 
Widespread and persisting international income differences have motivated ample 
research on the underlying factors. Aided by the developments in both growth theory 
and empirics, international differences in growth in per capita incomes or labour 
productivity have been decomposed in various fashions.1 Hall and Jones, among others, 
find that many of the disparities are explained by differences in (labour-augmenting) 
technology instead of differences in factor availability. According to their interpretation, 
this reflects international differences in the quality of social infrastructure or, more 
generally, in institutions. Recent research has further strengthened the case for the role 
of institutions.2 There is also evidence that geographical factors can account for poor 
performance (Sachs et al. 2004). Human capital may also be the deep determinant of 
economic growth, explaining also the institutional change (Glaeser et al. 2004). 
 
One problem with these studies is that they cannot properly differentiate the impact of 
institutions: if the institutions affect for example the incentives to adopt new technology 
or divert resources to unproductive activities, one should have a measure both for the 
potential of the economy and the extent to which this potential is used. We take first 
steps to fill this gap: labour productivity can be augmented by accumulation of physical 
and human capital, improvements in technologies (technological change) and the extent 
to which these improvements are actually utilized (productive efficiency or catch-up). 
We decompose the change in labour productivity in 83 countries into these four 
categories with a special emphasis on low-income countries and among them on highly-
indebted countries.  
 
This decomposition can shed light on the causes of international income differences. 
Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003) find that African problems can be traced to high price 
of capital goods, geographical factors, closedness to trade and too large public 
expenditures, as well as to conflicts. If geographical factors are very important by 
facilitating or delaying international trade and flow of information, one expects that the 
lack of technological catch-up plays a large role in the poor performance of 
geographically disadvantaged countries. Similarly, poor institutions can damage both 
the catch-up and accumulation of all types of capital and, hence, the various 
determinants of growth cannot be assigned uniquely to only one element in our 
decomposition. Yet, the decomposition gives some idea of the relative importance of the 
channels through which they have had an influence. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Hall and Jones (1999); Mankiw et al. (1992). 
2 Pande and Udry (2005); Acemoglu et al. (2002); Rodrik (2003); and Collier and Gunning (1999) for 
Africa.   2
The decomposition helps also to understand the impacts of the debt crisis. High debt 
reduces incentives to invest, as the returns from investment must be used for servicing 
the debt creating the debt Laffer curve (Krugman 1988). At the same time, high 
indebtedness increases the bargaining power of the debtor countries vis-a-vis the 
creditors allowing them to escape from reforms necessary for long-run growth (Birdsall 
et al. 2003). The relative importance of these two channels can be assessed by looking 
at the relative contributions of factor accumulation and catch-up in the highly indebted 
countries. 
 
The decomposition is based on constructing a world production possibility frontier 
using data envelopment analysis (DEA),3 as in our data it turns out that all the countries 
share the same technology. Productive efficiency is measured by the distance of a 
country’s production from the world production possibility frontier.4 We follow here 
Kumar and Russell (2002) with two crucial differences. While Kumar and Russell base 
their analysis on the basic Solow growth model framework, we use the Mankiw et al. 
(1992) framework, as the Solow model augmented with human capital accumulation fits 
the cross-country data very well.5 We analyse data from 83 countries, which is a much 
larger data set than in Kumar and Russell (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2004). We 
therefore get a much better focus on the low-income countries. Moreover, our data 
ranges from 1980 to 2000, while both Kumar and Russell and Henderson and Russell 
study the period 1965-1990. 
 
We find that developing countries, especially highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), 
have experienced large improvements in productive efficiency during the last two 
decades. This positive effect has been washed out by problems in capital accumulation 
with the result that the overall income distribution in these countries has remained 
stagnant. Also, production in these countries has shifted to sectors with below average 
productivity growth and/or it has used old technology more efficiently. Thus, it is 
inaccurate to assign the stagnation to institutions providing bad incentives. Institutional 
factors should rather be viewed in association with other factors, such as lack of finance 
for basic infrastructure. The theory of debt overhang seems also to be more relevant 
than the theory emphasizing bad incentives to account for the stagnation in HIPC 
countries. 
 
                                                 
3 We discuss the choice of the methodology in section 2.1. 
4 Recently Acemoglu et al. (2003) have proposed a model of growth in which the distance is determined 
endogenously. They apply the model to India. A classic model was built by Nelson and Phelps (1966). 
5 This idea has been picked up also by Henderson and Russell (2004). They use the restriction that human 
and physical capital are substitutes while in our work such a restriction is not used. In our framework, 
human capital and physical capital can be complements. This seems to be the empirically relevant 
alternative given the evidence for capital-skill complementarity.   3
The change in world distribution of income has been driven also by technological 
change, not only by capital accumulation as in earlier periods (Kumar and Russell 
2002). A natural interpretation is that the information and communication technology 
has shaped the international income distribution. 
1  Analytical framework and data 
1.1 Analytical  framework 
Production in year t in each country is given by the aggregate production function 
 
() t t t t t K H L E F Y , , , =         ( 1 )  
 
where  E = efficiency (catch-up) which measures how far from the efficient world 
production frontier the production is, L = labour force, H = human capital stock, and 
K = physical capital stock. Production is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale 
with respect to L, H ,  and K . This naturally gives average labour productivity as a 
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The country-specific efficiency scores are calculated by data envelopment analysis 
(DEA),6 which assigns a score of one to efficient countries situated at the world 
production frontier. Inefficient countries receive a score below one. Another option 
would have been to use some parametric frontier approach, such as stochastic frontier 
analysis. The main disadvantage of DEA is its deterministic nature and the resulting 
inability to distinguish between technical inefficiency and statistical noise. On the other 
hand, DEA does not require any functional specification for the relationship between 
inputs and outputs or for the inefficiency error term. Using it therefore means escaping 
various specification and estimation problems.7 An additional benefit of a DEA 
decomposition is that it can catch at least some of the implications of factor biased 
technological change. Caselli (2005) has argued that it can possibly explain much of the 
income differential between rich and poor countries. 
                                                 
6 Färe et al. (1994) is a good reference for those interested in the use of the method in the context of 
economics, while Charnes et al. (1978, 1979) are more known in the management-science literature. Yet 
another source is Lovell (1994). 
7 Murillo-Zamorano (2004) discusses the differences between parametric and non-parametric frontier 
methods in more detail.   4
1.2 The  data 
Countries 
The availability of data between years 1980 and 2000 restricts the number of countries 
that can be included in the analysis to 83. Although developing economies tend to have 
measurement errors in statistics, it can be hoped that ‘the strong signal from the 
diversity of the experience dominates the noise’ (Barro 2000). 
Output 
Output is measured by GDP (constant 1995 US$) from the World Bank (2004) World 
Development Indicators Online. 
Labour force 
As it is not straightforward to choose a proxy for labour force in empirical analysis with 
both developed and developing nations, we use two different measures to assure the 
robustness of the results. First, the official labour force statistics from WDI are 
relatively accurate as to developed countries, but are likely to underestimate the size of 
the actual labour force in many developing economies, where the size of the informal 
economy is larger. As the citizens entering the labour market in developing economies 
are typically younger than in developed economies, a second possible proxy for labour 
force is the population aged between 15 and 64 years, also from WDI.8 
Capital stock 
Capital stock estimates originate from Ruotinen (2005), who uses the perpetual 
inventory method to generate them (see also Henry et al. 2003; and Caselli 2005). He 
uses WDI data on gross fixed capital formation (constant 1995 US$) for investment, and 
sets the depreciation rate at 10 per cent in accordance with Henry et al. (2003). The 
formulas for capital stocks are 
 










where  K = the capital stock, δ = the depreciation rate, I = the gross fixed capital 
investment, and g
K = the annual average growth rate of the investments. Subscript i 
indexes country and t indexes time. 
                                                 
8 It is promising that both proxies produce relatively similar results.   5
Human capital stock 
The total human capital stock Hit for country i at time t is often calculated as 
it it it L S H × = , where Sit and Lit indicate average years of educational attainment and the 
stock of individuals engaged in productive activity, respectively. This is the approach 
also we follow. 
 
One of the most recent and widely used measures for Eit is that of Barro and Lee 
(2001).9 In accordance with the nature of the labour market in developing countries, we 
use their series of average years of schooling (including primary, secondary, and tertiary 
levels) for population over 15 years of age. It is also compatible with our second proxy 
for labour force, namely that of population aged between 15 and 64 years. 
 
When constructing the data set to be used at the efficiency analysis, the same proxy was 
used both as the labour force proxy and when calculating the total stock of human 
capital. Thus there were two data sets to begin with: 
 
1)  Y (total GDP), L (total labour force), K (total capital stock), H (Barro and Lee 
average years of schooling for population over 15 years of age x total labour force) 
2)  Y,  L (population 15-64), K,  H (Barro and Lee average years of schooling for 
population over 15 years of age x population 15-64). 
2 Efficiency  scores 
2.1  Efficiency scores for labour productivity 
Since we are particularly interested in changes in labour productivity, we concentrate on 
the case where inputs used to produce GDP per labour are physical and human capital 
per labour (equation (2)). The results for aggregate output are available upon request. 
 
With official labour force statistics as the proxy for labour (Table 1), France and Sierra 
Leone10 are the only countries that are efficient with an efficiency score of one over the 
whole period. The group of the least-efficient countries is composed of Malawi, 
Guyana, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These have the lowest 
scores. China starts at the bottom of the list in 1980 and manages to climb only few 
                                                 
9 Cohen and Soto (2001) provide an alternative data set for human capital based on some differences in 
sources and methodology. Correlation between their estimates and those of Barro and Lee (2001) is fairly 
high in levels, which implies that our overall results are not that dependent on the data set chosen, even if 
the correlation of the human capital estimates is significantly lower in first difference. 
10 Sierra Leone with its exceptionally low capital per labour ratio affects the scores of other low-income 
countries. In 1980, 54 countries, mostly developing economies, have Sierra Leone as their benchmark 
technology and in 2000, still 44 countries. Kumar and Russell (2002) find it possible that DEA might fail 
to identify the true production frontier especially at low capital-labour ratios. We check the sensitivity of 
results with a data set without Sierra Leone.   6
positions by 2000. If the population aged between 15 and 64 years of age is used as the 
proxy for individuals engaged in productive activity (the results are available upon 
request), Sierra Leone and Switzerland are the only efficient countries every year. The 
other countries on the frontier, although not every year, include United States, Sweden, 
Uruguay, France, Denmark, and Japan. The least efficient countries are the same as 
above. Thus, the results are not sensitive to the variable used to measure the labour 
input. Hence, in the following only the results based on data set 1 are used. 
Table 1: Efficiency scores based on the use official labour force statistics: labour productivity 
 1980 1985 1990 1995  2000
Algeria 0.50 0.43 0.39 0.38  0.42
Argentina 0.74 0.64 0.65 0.78  0.73
Australia 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.77  0.68
Austria 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.96  1.00
Bangladesh 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.53  0.61
Belgium 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97  0.95
Bolivia 0.56 0.52 0.57 0.68  0.69
Botswana 0.68 0.76 0.73 0.60  0.59
Brazil 0.77 0.68 0.66 0.71  0.67
Cameroon 0.60 0.59 0.45 0.43  0.62
Canada 0.98 0.91 0.84 0.82  0.78
Chile 0.78 0.77 0.87 0.85  0.76
China 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.37  0.46
Colombia 0.80 0.72 0.78 0.73  0.73
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.38 0.32 0.28 0.26  0.32
Costa Rica  0.87 0.82 0.84 0.80  0.83
Denmark 0.86 0.95 0.89 0.97  0.91
Dominican Rep.  0.71 0.64 0.57 0.58  0.72
Ecuador 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.69  0.75
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.61 0.51 0.53 0.60  0.73
El Salvador  0.87 0.78 0.80 0.84  0.85
Finland 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.80  0.85
France 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00
Gambia, The  0.87 0.67 0.61 0.59  0.73
Germany 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.85  0.80
Ghana 0.32 0.31 0.39 0.51  0.61
Greece 0.76 0.71 0.71 0.72  0.69
Guatemala 0.89 0.80 0.88 0.90  0.91
Guyana 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.26  0.35
Honduras 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.52  0.52
Hong Kong, China  0.82 0.77 0.83 0.82  0.68
Hungary 0.60 0.64 0.63 0.53  0.61
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Iceland 0.90 0.87 0.87  0.87  0.83
India 0.23 0.27 0.33  0.44  0.55
Indonesia 0.43 0.45 0.53  0.57  0.52
Iran, Islamic Rep.  0.44 0.49 0.53  0.54  0.61
Ireland 0.84 0.80 0.91  1.00  1.00
Israel 0.86 0.87 0.99  0.94  0.82
Italy 0.92 0.91 0.91  0.93  0.85
Jamaica 0.50 0.52 0.70  0.52  0.52
Japan 0.85 0.90 1.00  1.00  1.00
Jordan 0.63 0.57 0.46  0.47  0.53
Kenya 0.24 0.28 0.35  0.42  0.51
Korea, Rep.  0.77 0.77 0.75  0.66  0.60
Lesotho 0.23 0.24 0.28  0.25  0.26
Malawi 0.11 0.13 0.15  0.22  0.34
Malaysia 0.76 0.64 0.69  0.60  0.55
Mali 0.58 0.47 0.48  0.46  0.57
Mauritius 0.60 0.69 0.72  0.63  0.62
Mexico 0.85 0.75 0.72  0.62  0.71
Mozambique 0.53 0.38 0.46  0.53  0.57
Netherlands 0.81 0.83 0.85  0.89  0.89
New Zealand  0.80 0.81 0.75  0.80  0.72
Nicaragua 0.45 0.41 0.33  0.37  0.47
Niger 0.26 0.26 0.36  0.45  0.67
Norway 0.75 0.74 0.65  0.80  0.80
Pakistan 0.47 0.57 0.47  0.61  0.75
Panama 0.85 0.80 0.74  0.68  0.64
Papua New Guinea  0.50 0.45 0.43  0.56  0.65
Paraguay 0.73 0.61 0.61  0.58  0.59
Peru 0.81 0.74 0.62  0.66  0.64
Philippines 0.48 0.39 0.46  0.49  0.57
Portugal 0.84 0.79 0.84  0.76  0.64
Rwanda 0.52 0.46 0.42  0.35  0.58
Senegal 0.57 0.64 0.67  0.69  0.83
Sierra Leone  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00
Singapore 0.82 0.66 0.78  0.86  0.94
South Africa  0.88 0.72 0.78  0.75  0.79
Spain 0.89 0.89 0.89  0.83  0.74
Sri Lanka  0.30 0.32 0.35  0.44  0.51
Swaziland 0.54 0.47 0.69  0.63  0.65
Sweden 0.97 1.00 0.97  0.92  0.90
Switzerland 1.00 1.00 0.99  0.96  0.97
Syrian Arab Rep.  0.32 0.28 0.30  0.41  0.48
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Thailand 0.44 0.44 0.53 0.47  0.48
Togo 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.37  0.47
Tunisia 0.61 0.55 0.58 0.55  0.61
United Kingdom  0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94  0.84
United States  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.84
Uruguay 0.9998 0.80 1.00 1.00  1.00
Venezuela 0.61 0.56 0.66 0.65  0.68
Zambia 0.21 0.26 0.34 0.36  0.52
Zimbabwe 0.50 0.53 0.43 0.45  0.57
Source: The efficiency scores and decomposition of the labour productivity were obtained by OnFront 
Version 2.02. The scores were calculated with five-year intervals beginning from 1980 and ending with the 
year 2000. 
 
2.2  Do high-income countries and developing economies share the same 
technological knowledge?11 
The groups of high-income and developing countries may differ with respect to the 
availability of technology, invalidating the calculations above. We therefore use a 
method presented by Charnes et al. (1981) and discussed by Lovell (1994)12 to take the 
categorical environmental variable into account: the observations are first divided into 
two mutually exclusive groups. After the efficiency scores have been calculated for each 
group separately, the scores are used to scale the individual outputs to the efficient 
frontier in the respective group. New efficiency scores are then calculated for the 
combined group of all countries so that the scaled GDP figures are used as the output. 
 
The scaling of the countries to the efficient frontier in the country’s group results in 
much smaller differences in the final efficiency scores.13 The group of the most 
efficient countries comprises now of Austria, Belgium, France, and Sierra Leone closely 
tailed by Ireland, Spain, and Switzerland as well as a large number of other countries. 
At the other extreme, Brazil, Algeria, Argentina, Malaysia, South Africa, Venezuela, 
Tunisia, Iran, and the Republic of Korea fare less well. These results imply that the 
assumption of equal access to the same technology is reasonable. 
                                                 
11 In accordance with the World Bank convention, we use the term developing economies to denote low- 
and middle-income countries. 
12 The method was originally developed for separating management efficiency from programme 
efficiency. See Charnes et al. (1981). 
13 The results are available upon request.   9
3  Productivity distributions: how has the world of 1980 changed into the world 
of 2000? 
3.1  Average performance in country groups 
We decompose labour productivity in a manner analogous to Kumar and Russell 
(2002). Unlike them, we incorporate changes in human capital in the spirit of Mankiw 
et al. (1992). The technical details of the decomposition are presented in Appendix 1, 
whereas this section concentrates on the empirical results. The decomposition results are 
in Table 2. The percentage change in labour productivity between 1980 and 2000 is 
displayed in column 2 (y%). Columns 3-6 display the effects that changes in efficiency 
(EC%), technology (TC%), physical capital (K%), and human capital (H%) have had on 
labour productivity development in each country. 
Table 2: Decomposition of changes in labour productivity (L=official labour force 
statistics) 
 y% EC% TC% K%  H%
Algeria -26.3 -16.1 10.3 -28.0  10.7
Argentina -4.6 -1.0 9.2 -14.5  3.1
Australia 31.7 -15.7 19.2 29.9  1.0
Austria 45.2 17.9 6.6 5.9  9.1
Bangladesh 34.0 78.8 -44.1 16.5  15.0
Belgium 39.7 -0.4 9.1 18.4  8.6
Bolivia -14.2 24.0 -31.8 -5.2  7.0
Botswana 137.2 -13.7 -2.6 145.7  14.9
Brazil -8.9 -12.4 12.1 -13.4  7.1
Cameroon -5.5 3.7 -24.2 6.8  12.7
Canada 28.1 -19.9 11.2 41.3  1.7
Chile 67.3 -3.6 -3.9 75.0  3.2
China 352.9 349.1 -56.9 98.5  18.0
Colombia -6.8 -8.0 -8.9 7.0  3.9
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -62.1 -17.4 -55.4 -18.6  26.4
Costa Rica  9.5 -4.3 -1.0 12.4  2.9
Denmark 35.9 4.7 11.4 13.4  2.9
Dominican Rep.  30.1 1.7 -12.8 37.4  6.7
Ecuador -23.3 18.6 -16.6 -23.4  1.3
Egypt, Arab Rep.  52.8 20.2 -19.1 24.2  26.6
El Salvador  -12.7 -3.0 -13.6 -7.1  12.1
Finland 53.8 8.3 13.1 8.6  15.7
France 37.0 0.0 7.8 14.0  11.5
Gambia, The  -0.4 -16.8 -40.0 33.3  49.8
Germany 39.0 3.1 10.5 14.9  6.2
table continues..   10
Ghana 6.0 93.3 -51.4 6.0 6.5 
Greece 11.0 -9.6 20.2 -1.1 3.3 
Guatemala -9.1 3.0 -6.1 -10.5 5.0 
Guyana -13.7 123.3 -7.3 -59.8 3.7 
Honduras -13.9 -9.1 -21.5 3.4 16.7 
Hong Kong, China  103.6 -17.4 12.4 110.0 4.4 
Hungary 29.0 0.4 -4.0 33.6 0.1 
Iceland 26.3 -7.8 14.7 11.0 7.5 
India 99.1 140.4 -53.0 39.8 26.1 
Indonesia 64.6 22.6 -35.8 85.7 12.7 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  16.5 37.4 2.4 -24.9 10.3 
Ireland 122.4 18.8 22.9 42.4 6.9 
Israel 29.1 -5.6 14.9 18.6 0.4 
Italy 28.6 -7.8 13.1 13.6 8.5 
Jamaica -2.5 4.9 -4.5 -7.3 5.0 
Japan 44.5 17.2 7.7 6.3 7.7 
Jordan -28.6 -15.6 -1.3 -21.2 8.9 
Kenya -11.1 111.9 -49.5 -24.8 10.5 
Korea, Rep.  166.5 -22.5 1.4 218.5 6.5 
Lesotho 60.8 15.9 -18.7 66.2 2.7 
Malawi 9.4 208.5 -42.4 -43.1 8.2 
Malaysia 94.8 -28.5 -1.8 163.1 5.4 
Mali 1.2 -2.6 -7.8 1.7 10.7 
Mauritius 96.0 3.1 -2.9 90.8 2.6 
Mexico -8.2 -16.6 0.5 1.6 7.7 
Mozambique 27.2 7.7 -45.6 82.8 18.8 
Netherlands 26.9 9.9 6.1 2.2 6.5 
New Zealand  9.2 -10.8 10.1 10.8 0.3 
Nicaragua -36.8 3.4 -26.6 -25.6 11.8 
Niger -34.8 160.2 -10.9 -75.7 15.7 
Norway 55.2 6.5 8.3 3.8 29.7 
Pakistan 53.3 59.6 -38.9 21.3 29.7 
Panama 6.5 -24.9 -9.9 47.6 6.6 
Papua New Guinea  9.2 30.7 -9.3 -17.9 12.1 
Paraguay -7.8 -19.6 -12.7 25.3 4.8 
Peru -24.9 -20.4 -9.1 -1.0 4.8 
Philippines -7.4 18.5 -34.4 9.1 9.2 
Portugal 62.5 -24.0 23.3 53.5 13.0 
Rwanda -21.4 12.9 -54.8 23.9 24.3 
Senegal 14.5 45.1 -32.5 10.2 6.0 
Sierra Leone  -54.4 0.0 -97.3 1380.8 15.1 
Singapore 137.7 14.4 16.4 55.4 14.8 
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South Africa  -19.9 -10.6 4.5 -20.0  7.2
Spain 35.5 -16.6 22.3 25.8  5.5
Sri Lanka  66.3 73.6 -44.1 56.2  9.8
Swaziland 31.8 20.1 -13.3 13.9  11.1
Sweden 31.9 -7.8 21.4 15.0  2.5
Switzerland 5.6 -2.9 6.1 1.8  0.7
Syrian Arab Rep.  -1.7 48.9 -11.4 -32.8  10.9
Thailand 117.8 8.0 -16.6 118.0  10.9
Togo -27.6 42.9 -28.7 -36.9  12.6
Tunisia 30.3 0.8 2.2 15.9  9.2
United Kingdom  49.7 -9.0 15.9 39.0  2.1
United States  42.5 -16.2 15.5 46.8  0.2
Uruguay 1.8 0.0 -0.1 -2.0  3.9
Venezuela -30.9 10.4 2.8 -40.9  3.0
Zambia -32.3 140.8 -33.8 -62.4  13.0
Zimbabwe -1.3 13.2 -32.9 -7.0  39.7
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The average percentage changes between 1980 and 2000 for different country groups 
are collected in Table 3. Average productivity improvement in the world was mostly 
due to physical capital deepening, but this result is strongly affected by the presence of 
Sierra Leone in calculations.14 Without Sierra Leone, the change in efficiency plays an 
equally important role. 
 
The averages reveal some interesting differences between the country groups. The 
average growth in output per worker, i.e. labour productivity, exceeded 45 per cent in 
high-income countries, but remained below 20 per cent in developing economies. The 
effect of the change in efficiency is close to 30 per cent in developing economies, while 
the contribution of the component is negative (-2.8 per cent) in high-income countries. 
In contrast, the average effect from technological change, i.e. from the movement of the 
best practice frontier, has been positive at over 10 per cent in high-income countries but 
is negative -20 per cent in developing economies. This is a major explanation for the 




                                                 
14 If Sierra Leone with its exceptionally low capital per labour ratio is excluded from the data 
envelopment analysis, the efficiency scores of those lower-income countries that originally had Sierra 
Leone as a part of their reference technology improve. The most dramatic impacts are seen in the 
decompositions. Although the relative contributions of particularly efficiency change and capital 
accumulation may change somewhat drastically within a country, the signs of the contributions remain 
unchanged. These results are available upon request.   12
Table 3: Mean effects in different groups of countries 
  
The contribution to the change in labour 
productivity of the change in 
  
The change 










Mean, all countries  27.3 19.5 -9.8 35.5 10.0
  excluding Sierra Leone  28.3 19.8 -8.8 19.1  10.0
               
Mean, high-income countries 45.3 -2.8 13.6 24.1  6.8
Mean, developing economies 19.5 29.2 -19.9 40.5  11.4
   excluding Sierra Leone  20.8 29.7 -18.6 17.0  11.3
Mean, middle-income countries 28.4 15.3 -9.0 23.4  7.9
Mean, upper-middle-income countries 38.3 -8.9 0.3 49.8  5.3
Mean, lower-middle-income countries 22.4 30.0 -14.6 7.4  9.5
Mean, low-income countries 3.9 53.5 -39.3 70.5  17.5
  excluding Sierra Leone  6.9 56.2 -36.4 5.0  17.6
               
Mean, not classified by debt 45.3 -2.8 13.6 24.1  6.8
Mean, less-indebted countries 58.8 38.2 -17.0 40.8  11.0
Mean, moderately-indebted countries 15.0 12.7 -17.6 22.0 11.0
Mean, severely-indebted countries -13.3 43.3 -26.2 66.3  12.3
   excluding Sierra Leone  -10.7 46.0 -21.7 -15.9  12.1
               
Mean, HIPCs  -15.0 51.8 -36.7 66.5 15.0
   excluding Sierra Leone  -12.7 54.8 -33.2 -10.8  15.0
Note: These are non-weighted arithmetic means. Country classifications presented in Appendix 2 are the 
World Bank classifications for the year 2000. These were chosen because the results can now be 
analysed from the end-of-the-period point of view and because similar classifications are unavailable for 
the beginning of the period. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
How can one explain this technological implosion? One answer is that at the same time 
as these countries have improved their efficiency, their production structure has 
concentrated more in activities with relatively slow technological change. Secondly, 
some developing economies may be liquidity constrained for example due to high debt, 
and cannot afford to buy the latest technologies but are, however, able to improve the 
efficiency at which they are using their old equipment.15 The accumulation of physical 
capital seems to play an important role in sustaining average international income 
differentials. The contribution of human capital accumulation displays less variation 
although it has generally been a little higher in the developing economies. The striking 
                                                 
15 Henderson and Russell (2004) rule out the possibility of technological implosion. We did not want to 
follow them for the reasons just given.   13
observation is that improvements in efficiency seem to have been largest in the 
countries with either severe or low levels of debt.16 The interpretation of this result will 
be given below. 
 
The group average changes can be produced by large changes in just few countries. To 
begin with the analysis of changes in the entire distribution of labour productivity, we 
plot the growth rates of labour productivity and its components against the income per 
capita in 1980 in Figure 1. The first diagram gives the changes in output per worker 
over 1980-2000, the next ones changes in efficiency, technical change, human capital 
accumulation and physical capital accumulation. The figures also display the trends 
(basically reproducing the same information as Table 3). 
Figure 1: Percentage changes in output per worker, efficiency, technology, human 
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The dispersion among low-income countries is huge in comparison to high-income 
countries. Secondly, there is some non-linearity: the poorest countries have gained most 
from efficiency improvements, but the medium-income countries the least. This 
contrasts with Kumar and Russell (2002: figure 4b), who find that all countries 
benefited equally (little) from efficiency improvements. 
                                                 
16 The differences between debtor country groups are sensitive to the year on which the classification is 
based, because movements from one indebtedness group to another are not rare. The basic result of large 
efficiency improvements in debtor countries is not sensitive to this problem.   14
3.2  Productivity distributions in country groups 
We next examine the distribution dynamics of output per worker to get an idea of how 
individual countries and country groups performed, and how the distribution of labour 
productivity changed between 1980 and 2000. The distributions of labour productivity 
in these two years are in Figure 2 (the dotted line refers to the distribution in 2000 
identified by c in the figure legend). These are kernel estimates of the distributions. 
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The usual story is that the world income per capita distribution has two peaks (Jones 
1997), which was confirmed by Kumar and Russell (2002). Our results for the year 
1980 imply likewise a bimodal distribution, but the evidence for 2000 is weaker. This 
may naturally be partly due to differences in data sets, but one cannot rule right away 
out the possibility that the world is not as polarized as it used to be. 
 
The kernel estimates of distributions of the efficiency scores (or catch-up measures) for 
years 1980 (label kdensity effb) and 2000 (label kdensity effc) are in Figure 3. The first 
panel depicts the efficiency scores calculated with the data comprising Sierra Leone, 
while the right-hand figure is based on a data set without Sierra Leone. The figures 
imply that the same discussion holds for both cases. The density concentrated at the 
lowest efficiency scores is smaller in 2000 than in 1980. The second more striking 
feature is that the poorest countries, which had the lowest scores in 1980, have gained a 
lot in efficiency while rich countries have been losing. 
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To study how the labour productivity distribution of 1980 was transformed into the 
distribution of 2000, we analyze how the individual components of the decomposition 
(A6) presented in Appendix 1 change the distribution of 1980. We first show the 
transformation for all countries, then for developing economies, then for different 
income and debt classes within developing economies, and finally for heavily indebted 
poor countries.17 In Figure 4, the first diagram reproduces Figure 2. The second 
diagram shows the kernel estimate of the distribution in 2000 (depicted by the dash line) 







where b = 1980 and c = 2000. Like in Kumar and Russell (2002), the latter and its 
equivalents will be called counterfactual distributions in the text below. The third 
diagram gives the impact of the cumulative changes in efficiency and technological 
change on 1980 labour productivity, the fourth the combined impact of efficiency, 
technological change and physical capital accumulation and the last diagram (producing 
the first) the combined impact of all the underlying changes, including human capital 
                                                 
17 We use the test devised by Li (Pagan and Ullah 1999: 68-9, test statistic given by their equation 2.144) 
to test for the significance of the distribution change. The test is valid also when x and y are dependent. 
Test results are presented in Appendix 5.   16
accumulation.18 The order of presentation does not influence the results 
(transformations using other representative orders of presentation are given in 
Appendix 3). 
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The distributions of labour productivity in 1980 and in 2000 are statistically different. 
There is no single driver of the change in the distribution. Statistically,19 the most 
significant driver of change has been technological change together with physical and 
human capital accumulation. Changes in efficiency have also contributed to the 
transformation of the labour productivity distribution by taking away the other peak 
from the distribution of 1980 (Figure 4). 
                                                 
18 Letter e in the legend of the next figures and diagrams refers to efficiency, t to technological change, h 
to the contribution of human capital, and k to the contribution of physical capital. 
19 See the Table in Appendix 5.   17
High-income countries 
In high-income countries, the distribution has been altered jointly by technological 
change and physical capital accumulation.20 This holds irrespective of the order in 
which the components are taken into account (Figure A4 in Appendix 4). Statistically 
the distributions of labour productivity in 1980 and in 2000 are different. 
Developing economies 
Figure 5 displays the results for developing economies, the first diagram giving again 
the kernel estimates of the actual distributions. Statistically, the distributions of 1980 
and 2000 are identical. Yet, there has been a significant improvement in efficiency, 
which has, jointly with human capital, increased developing country income (ceteris 
paribus). The positive effect has been nullified by technological change and lack of 
capital accumulation. 
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Is it possible to analyze the improvement in developing countries’ efficiency 
(technological catch-up) in terms of the theories reviewed in the introduction? 
Geography cannot matter much, as the efficiency gain has been widespread (see 
                                                 
20 Exactly, the Li-test indicates that the distribution of labour productivity obtained from the distribution 
of 1980 by taking into account the changes in efficiency and physical capital stock is the same as the 
actual year 2000 distribution. For other combinations of underlying changes this does not hold.   18
Table 2). Similarly, it is hard to make a case for a change in institutions in this period as 
the single major factor causing the stagnation of developing country incomes. Such a 
result would have to be based on a more detailed analysis on the common (institutional) 
features of those countries that have gained in efficiency. 
 
There thus seems to be a puzzle, which is even larger when we look at the debtor 
countries. The phenomenon is consistent with the Nelson-Phelps model, which implies 
the catch-up rate is an increasing function of human capital intensity. The model also 
helps to understand why the contribution of human capital, for given catch-up, seems to 
be small. In addition finance constraints may explain the result. 
Middle-income countries 
In middle-income countries (see Figure A5 in Appendix 4), the distributions of labour 
productivity in 1980 and 2000 are the same. The counterfactual 1980 distribution 
combining the effects of changes in efficiency and human and physical capital stocks 
differs significantly from the distribution of 2000. 
Low-income countries 
In low-income countries of Figure 6, changes in efficiency (jointly with human capital) 
and technology are statistically significant drivers of change, but netting each other out. 
Changes in efficiency improve incomes. 



























0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Output per Worker


























0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Output per Worker


























0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Output per Worker


























0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Output per Worker


























0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Output per Worker
kdensity yetkh kdensity yc
   19
Debtor countries 
In all three debtor country groups from severely-indebted to less-indebted countries, the 
actual 1980 distribution and all counterfactual distributions are statistically identical 
with the 2000 distribution (see also Figures A6-A8). This means that the component 
changes have been too small and too diverse, perhaps also to different directions, to 
have had a statistically significant impact. 
 
HIPCs 
Again, in the aggregate there has not been any statistically significant change in the 
distribution between 1980 and 2000 (Figure 7). Changes in productive efficiency have, 
however, had a large, statistically significant impact on the distribution of labour 
productivity in HIPCs: improvements in efficiency have tended to reduce the proportion 
of countries at low productivity levels and increased the proportion of countries at 
relatively high output per worker levels. Hence, efficiency improvements have tended to 
benefit the highly-indebted countries. These benefits have been taken away by the 
technological implosion and contraction in physical capital accumulation. 
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The result21 gives fairly strong support for the reasoning behind the debt Laffer curve: 
high indebtedness reduces incentives to invest in productive capital. Hansen (2004) 
finds also that high indebtedness reduces growth by reducing investment. Our data does 
not support the possibility that high indebtedness allows debtor countries to escape the 
necessary policy reforms. If the implication of the hypothesis is that the lack of reforms 
increases the waste of resources, then exactly the opposite has happened according to 
our data. Since most of the HIPCs are in sub-Saharan Africa, the results are in line with 
Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), who find that the high price of capital goods 
significantly reduces income there. 
4 Conclusions 
We studied the world distribution of output per worker between the years 1980 and 
2000. We used data envelopment analysis to decompose the changes in the distribution 
of output per worker into changes in productive efficiency (which can be interpreted to 
measure the degree of technological catch-up), changes in best practice technology 
(technological change), accumulation of human capital, and accumulation of physical 
capital. The most significant results are: 
 
a)  The distribution of income in developing and HIPC countries has not changed 
between 1980 and 2000. This stagnation has been created by decline in capital 
accumulation, as at the same time improvements in production efficiency have been 
remarkable. In HIPCs, resources have been shifted to sectors with below average 
productivity growth and/or production has been using old technology more 
efficiently, while at the same time investments in new technology have remained 
very low. This implies that one should not focus on institutions alone to explain 
stagnation, as institutional explanations usually emphasize the inefficiencies created 
by bad institutions. Instead, one should look for factors working together with 
institutional factors. The result also supports the reasoning behind the debt Laffer 
curve, as it implies that excessive debt creates a tax on investment. The analysis 
does not support the view that high indebtedness allows countries to escape reforms. 
 
b)  The world distribution of output per worker since 1980 until 2000 has been altered 
jointly by technological change and accumulation of physical and human capital. 
Technological change together with changes in productive efficiency has had some 
effect, too. No single factor can explain the change since 1980s. This is in contrast 
with studies focusing on earlier periods: they have found the deepening of physical 
capital to be the major factor. 
 
                                                 
21 To check the robustness of the results we have made the decompositions based on the efficiency scores 
calculated without Sierra Leone With some minor exceptions all the results hold. The results are available 
upon request.   21
c)  Developed and developing countries share the same frontier technology. 
 
A look at the distributions can thus clarify some of the issues related to the problems of 
development. To get further, it is necessary to model explicitly for example the 
determinants of efficiency. In the context of DEA this requires special care (for example 
Simar and Wilson 2003), but the benefits may be large. This is left for future work. 
 
Appendix 1 
Decomposition of output/worker 
We decompose labour productivity in a manner analogous to Kumar and Russell (2002) 
but incorporating also changes in human capital.22 For any country for b(ase) and 
c(urrent) periods change in labour productivity can be decomposed into changes in 
efficiency and potential output: 
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() b b b b
c c c c
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=           ( A 1 )  
 
where  t t h k ,  are the physical capital and human capital stocks per capita for period t. 
Similarly, et is the efficiency score for period t. The potential output for the economy in 
period  t is by definition  t t t t t e y h k y / ) , ( = . Change in potential output can be 
decomposed into changes in technology and inputs. The problem is that it matters in 





















































= =      (A2) 
 
The first ratio measures the change in efficiency, the second ratio the impact of 
technological change, the third the impact of human capital accumulation and the fourth 


































=        ( A 3 )  
 
                                                 
22 Our approach differs from Henderson and Russell (2004), who decompose the growth of labour 
productivity into the growth of output per efficiency unit of labour and the growth of human capital.   22
The third ratio measures the impact of physical capital accumulation, and the last the 
impact of human capital accumulation. The problem is solved by taking the geometric 



































































     (A4) 
 
The first ratio is again the change in efficiency, the second component is the 
technological change, the third measures the impact of human capital accumulation and 
the fourth the impact of physical capital accumulation. 
 
In (A4) it still matters which capital stocks and techniques are used as the base, as the 

































=         ( A 5 )  
 
In addition, (A5) has the problem that the order in which the impacts of the capital 
























































































































































  (A6) 
 
where the first ratio measures the change in productive efficiency, the second 
technological change, the third the impact of human capital accumulation, and the last 
the impact of physical capital accumulation. 
   23
Appendix 2 
Table A1: Country classifications for 2000 
BY INCOME LEVEL 
  
High income  Developing economies 
Australia  Upper middle income  Lower middle income  Low income 
Austria Argentina  Algeria  Bangladesh 
Belgium Botswana  Bolivia  Cameroon 
Canada  Brazil  China  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Denmark Chile  Colombia Gambia,  The 
Finland  Costa Rica  Dominican Republic  Ghana 
France Hungary  Ecuador  India 
Germany  Korea, Rep.  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Indonesia 
Greece Malaysia  El  Salvador  Kenya 
Hong Kong, China  Mauritius Guatemala  Lesotho 
Iceland Mexico  Guyana Malawi 
Ireland Panama  Honduras  Mali 
Israel  South Africa  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Mozambique 
Italy Uruguay Jamaica  Nicaragua 
Japan Venezuela,  RB  Jordan Niger 
Netherlands    Papua New Guinea  Pakistan 
New Zealand    Paraguay  Rwanda 
Norway   Peru  Senegal 
Portugal   Philippines  Sierra  Leone 
Singapore   Sri  Lanka  Togo 
Spain   Swaziland  Zambia 
Sweden    Syrian Arab Republic  Zimbabwe 
Switzerland   Thailand   
United Kingdom    Tunisia   
United States       
      
BY INDEBTEDNESS 
      
Not classified  Less indebted  Moderately indebted  Severely indebted 
Australia Bangladesh  Algeria  Argentina 
Austria Botswana  Bolivia  Brazil 
Belgium China  Chile  Cameroon 
Canada  Costa Rica  Colombia  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Denmark  Dominican Republic  Gambia, The  Ecuador 
Finland  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Ghana  Guyana   24
France El  Salvador Honduras  Indonesia 
Germany Guatemala  Hungary  Jordan 
Greece India  Jamaica Malawi 
Hong Kong, China  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Kenya  Nicaragua 
Iceland Korea,  Rep. Malaysia  Niger 
Ireland Lesotho  Mali  Pakistan 
Israel Mexico  Mauritius  Peru 
Italy Paraguay  Mozambique Rwanda 
Japan  South Africa  Panama  Sierra Leone 
Netherlands  Sri Lanka  Papua New Guinea  Syrian Arab Republic 
New Zealand  Swaziland  Philippines  Zambia 
Norway   Senegal  
Portugal   Thailand   
Singapore   Togo   
Spain   Tunisia   
Sweden   Uruguay  
Switzerland   Venezuela,  RB   
United Kingdom    Zimbabwe   
United States       
      
Highly indebted poor countries    
Bolivia Mali     
Cameroon Mozambique     
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Nicaragua     
Gambia, The  Niger     
Ghana Rwanda     
Guyana Senegal     
Honduras Sierra  Leone     
Kenya Togo     
Malawi Zambia     
Source: the World Bank 2002.   25
Appendix 3 
Decomposition of changes in world distribution of output per worker: alternative 
orderings 
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Appendix 4 
Decomposition of changes in the distribution of output per worker in different 
groups of countries 




















20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Output per Worker




















20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Output per Worker




















20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Output per Worker




















20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Output per Worker




















20000 40000 60000 80000 100000
Output per Worker
kdensity yketh kdensity yc
 



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker
kdensity yetkh kdensity yc
   28



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker



















0 10000 20000 30000
Output per Worker
kdensity yetkh kdensity yc
 




















0 5000 10000 15000
Output per Worker



















0 5000 10000 15000
Output per Worker



















0 5000 10000 15000
Output per Worker



















0 5000 10000 15000
Output per Worker



















0 5000 10000 15000
Output per Worker
kdensity yetkh kdensity yc
 
   29
Figure A8: Counterfactual distributions of labour productivity: severely-indebted 
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Appendix 5 
Statistical tests for the change in distribution 
We used the bootstrap method to calculate the small sample distributions on which to 
base our tests. We resampled each country group 1000 times. Table 2A denotes the 
acceptance of the null-hypothesis indicated in the left most column, and R its rejection. 
For example in the HIPC case A in the first cell indicates that the null of no change in 
actual distribution between 1980 and 2000 is accepted. All tests are at 5 per cent 
significance level. 














f(yc)=g(yb)  R  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yE) R  R  A  A  A  R 
f(yc)=g(yT) R  R  A  R  A  A 
f(yc)=g(yK)  R  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yH)  R  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yET)  R  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yEK)  R  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yEH)  R  R  R R A R 
f(yc)=g(yTK) A  A  A  R  A  A 
f(yc)=g(yTH)  A  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yKH)  R  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yETK)  A  A  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yETH)  A  R  A  A A A 
f(yc)=g(yEKH)  R  A  R  R R R 
f(yc)=g(yTKH)  A  A  A  A A A 











f(yc)=g(yb) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yE) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yT) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yK) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yH) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yET) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yEK) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yEH) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yTK) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yTH) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yKH) A  A  A         31
f(yc)=g(yETK) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yETH) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yEKH) A  A  A       
f(yc)=g(yTKH) A  A  A       
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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